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The experiences described in the VIP transcripts are incredibly varied and yet 
frequently explicitly labelled by participants as “voices.” How can we make sense of 
this? If we reflect carefully on uses of the word “voice”, we see that it can express at 
least two entirely different concepts, which pick out categorically different 
phenomena. One concept picks out a speech sound (e.g. “This synthesizer has a 
“voice” setting”). Another concept picks out a specific agent (e.g. “I hear two 
voices: one is a ten year-old boy…”). This chapter explores how these two concepts 
are related to one another in the context of voice-hearing. 
 
What has struck us both about these interview transcripts is that the experiences 
reported in them that are called “voices” are, first, hugely varied, and, second, do not all 
happily fall under the label “auditory verbal hallucination” (AVH).1 Accordingly, a more 
phenomenologically sensitive engagement with detailed first-person reports (of which these 
transcripts are exemplary) is needed. In this context, phenomenology can be helpful in several 
ways. For one thing, it can help develop a more accurate description of the individual’s 
experience – i.e., one that preserves the integrity of both their experience as lived as well as 
their subsequent reports about that experience – which in turn can serve as a tool for 
cultivating a kind of empathy (Ratcliffe 2012). Additionally, although phenomenology is 
generally not concerned with providing an account of underlying cognitive, neural or 
biological processes, it can nevertheless assist with developing such accounts. That is, it can 
assist the development of neurocognitive and biosocial models of voice hearing, for 
example—which are primarily concerned with causal-mechanistic explanations—both by 
providing an explanatory target for such models as well as by assisting the evaluation of 
existing models against the experiences as described in first-person reports such as these 
(McCarthy-Jones et al 2014).  
Phenomenology starts with open-ended questions such as: What is it like for an 
individual to be in a certain mental state, such as hearing a voice? What is the meaning of that 
experience for the individual? This phenomenological orientation is apparent in the consistent 
way the interviews in these transcripts begin. First, the interviewer acknowledges that voices 
“can mean lots of different things” to different people, from something that “might involve 
sound” to the feeling “that someone or something is communicating with you”, or even “a 
form of telepathy or loud thoughts”. This is an acknowledgment to the individual being 
interviewed that voice-hearing is a rich and experientially diverse kind of experience, and that 
they should describe the experience as it happens for them. This experiential diversity is also 
tacitly acknowledged by the open-endedness of the very first question—“Could you try to 
describe to me some of the voices or voice-like experiences you’ve been having?”—along 
with an encouragement “to use your own terms, your own language” in providing these 
descriptions.      
   Inspired by these transcripts—and as a way of gesturing toward a more nuanced 
phenomenological characterization of voice-hearing—we want to acknowledge the rich 
diversity of experiences found in these reports by isolating at least two things that “voice” 
 
1 The label of AVH has been criticized by many (e.g. Slade and Bentall 1988) including contributors to 
this volume 
seems to mean in this context. We say “at least” because we do not suggest that these two 
concepts are in any way exhaustive. However, notice that we do not need them to be. If the 
category of things called “voices” in clinical contexts actually picks out a number of distinct 
phenomena (two, three or four etc.) then we should be mindful of that plurality in general, 
and wary of using the term “auditory verbal hallucination” in particular. A commitment to 
phenomenological sensitivity should breed this kind of caution.  
 Before we embark on this brief project, a word about method. We are an analytic 
philosopher and a phenomenologist, and so we will proceed by conceptual and 
phenomenological analysis. How do these things fit together? Talking about experience is a 
strange phenomenon, since it involves using a public tool to get at something very private. 
The public tool—language—is a rather blunt and coarse-grained instrument for capturing the 
precise nature of a given experiential episode, such as, for instance, the character and 
structure of hearing voices versus more general features of audition as a distinct perceptual 
modality. As long as it is not actively misleading, any given description of experience rules 
out a large number of possibilities about what that experience might be like. However, it does 
not rule out all of the possibilities; it does not narrow them down to one. In such a situation, 
the description is accurate, but inevitably too coarse-grained. In light of this relationship 
between the language used to talk about experience and the experience itself, we proceed in 
two steps.  
 
Step 1. The conceptual analysis of “voice” will pick out two different things that 
could be meant by “voice.” This is coarse-grained. 
Step 2. The phenomenological analysis then elaborates on the precise possible nature 
of the experience in question.  
 
In principle, then, the coarse-grained conceptual categories further subdivide 
phenomenologically. Little wonder thinking of voices as a unified phenomenon is misleading! 
 
 
Two Concepts of Voice 
 
Concept 1 
Let us begin with the concept that is closest to that of “auditory verbal hallucination”. This 
concept picks out a particular auditory quality of experience, namely, a speech-like quality. 
This is the sense of “voice” you might find in the utterance: “This synthesizer has a ‘voice’ 
setting.” Note how there are two further subtle ambiguities here. “Voice,” with this focus on 
auditory quality (pointing out that it sounds like a human voice, rather than say a violin or a 
klaxon) can refer to the subjective experience or the environmental stimulus (the speech 
sound, the pressure ripples in the air). It can also refer to someone’s capacity or disposition to 
produce a sound with a particular quality: so the statement “She has a beautiful singing voice” 
holds true even when the person is not singing). So, “voice” in this sense, with its auditory 
qualitative focus, can take a subjective or objective flavor, and can also pick out something 
actual or dispositional. 
Many speakers in these transcripts seem to use this sense of voice. Alex, for instance, 
says that the voices he hears are like “a distance voice in a different part of the house and 
you’re just hearing it.” Sometimes they “sound like it’s just someone going down the street 
outside”; sometimes the voices “were a little bit louder, and sometimes quieter, so it was, 
again, making you doubt whether you were hearing or not.” What is interesting here is that, 
despite variations in volume, location and felt proximity of the voices, Alex consistently 
experiences these voices as voices. In other words, he does not confuse them with other 
auditory stimuli, despite the fact, he says, that they are often hard to hear. Moreover, while 
Alex’s descriptions contain some mention of the thematic content of the voices—i.e., what 
they say to him (“threats”, “insults left, right, centre”, etc.)—the bulk of his report focuses on 
the speech-like qualities of these voices and how, despite a variety of ways these qualities are 
presented to him, he nevertheless experiences these qualities as speech-like. Often, he tells us, 
he is unable to understand the voices. However, he still recognizes the voices by their speech-
like qualities: “soft tones…as if it was like a female,” or “quite rustic, deep voices,” and other 
times “a sinister type of voice”. 
Similarly, Bill consistently describes hearing voices that start “like a bark” or “a 
shout or a noise, you know like someone that is more just ehm like a bang on the table or 
something like that, sort of…but more of a vocal version of that.” However, Bill does not 
confuse these voices with a bang on a table or genuine barking. He tells us that “it’s similar to 
a dog bark but it’s not entirely a dog bark” – again, because the voices manifest, 
experientially, with a distinctive auditory quality that specifies them as voices. Like Alex, Bill 
spends some time describing what the voices say. However, most of his focus is on qualities 
of his experience of the voice, independent of this content. Again, these qualities are what 
appear to be most phenomenologically salient.   
When we say that this concept of “voice” picks out a particular “auditory quality” 
there are two different ways in which this can be interpreted: as rich or sparse. This issue is 
related to an ongoing debate in philosophy of perception about whether the content of 
perceptual experience can ever be rich, namely, can ever go beyond the “low-level 
properties” that are thought of as basic to that sensory modality. For vision, the question is 
whether all we ever really see are colour, shape and shade, or whether we literally see trees, 
or even, with relevant expertise, oak trees (Siegel 2006). For audition the question is whether 
what we experience goes beyond loudness, pitch and timbre. Without going into the 
technicalities of this debate, we certainly intend a rich interpretation of “auditory quality” 
here. We intend it to include properties that go well beyond the “low-level properties” and 
include the experience of, e.g. personhood, feminity, aggression. One might think that 
allowing this richness risks collapsing Concept 1 into Concept 2, which we are about to 
introduce, but this would be to misunderstand the two concepts. However rich we take 
auditory experience to be, when we use “voice” to express Concept 2, we are not picking out 
the auditory aspects of an experience at all (even though the experience may well be an 
auditory one). 
 
 
Concept 2 
The second concept that “voice” can express picks out, not so much an auditory quality of a 
sound (however richly this is conceived), but a particular agent, what Felicity Deamer and 
colleagues (Deamer and Wilkinson 2015; Deamer and Hayward 2018) have called the 
“speaker behind the voice.” This concept is intrinsically related to the experience of 
something with its own perspective and agency and goes beyond the superficially auditory. 
(Indeed, not only does this build onto the auditory experience, it also sometimes circumvents 
it altogether, as in the case of soundless voices (Wilkinson 2019)). Often, it involves the 
binding of this agentive experience into a singular agent representation persisting over time 
(see Wilkinson and Bell 2016). This is the sense of “voice” that is very commonly used in the 
context of hearing voices. Indeed, it is implicit in a question that is so often asked of voice 
hearers: “How many voices do you hear?” This question is asking the voice-hearer how many 
re-identifiable agents are represented over time across several experiential episodes. This 
question makes no sense otherwise. It is not a question about the qualitative variety of some 
relatively two-dimensional auditory experience. Indeed, it isn’t even a question about the 
variety of what is said (i.e., its thematic or semantic content), or even about the qualitative 
personality of the represented agents. The personality of a “voice”, in this sense that picks out 
the identity of an agent, can change over time. They can shift from being nice to nasty. 
Personality traits are features of these voices, but they are not definitive of them. The question 
“How many voices do you hear?” is one about specific individual identities. In many of these 
transcripts the voices have personality traits, but these do not appear fully bound to clearly re-
identifiable individuals. The question of how many voices these individuals hear is not 
answerable. These voice-hearers hear voices in both the speech sound and agentive sense, but 
the voice-as-agent is transient and untrackable. In some of the transcripts, however, the agents 
can be tracked, and hence counted. 
We find an example of this second concept of voice in Dan, for example, when he 
says that, “over the last couple of months I’ve sort of been hearing I think up to seven 
different voices.” Of phenomenological interest here is the fact that Dan experiences these 
voices as individuated by their spatial continuity – i.e., where each of these voices originate 
from, respectively, within his inner psychoacoustic landscape. Sometimes, he says, “when it’s 
inside the head, very, very loud and it’s like it consumes all the space around you, and you 
feel like you’re kind of suffocating in it”. At other times, the voices are externally located but   
very close by (e.g., “it’s like it’s pounding right in your ear, it’s like it’s, they’re talking right 
into your ear”), or even more spatially remote (“sometimes it sounds like it’s somebody 
maybe within the same room as me, or sat next to me”). Other voice-hearers in these 
transcripts seem to individuate their voices by personality trait (e.g. Sean individuates one of 
his voices as an angry person). The take-home message from this is that the grounds on which 
is built the singular representation that constitutes the voice (Concept 2) as a persisting entity 
over time can vary enormously, as can the “depth” of ageny represented in the experience 
(Wilkinson and Bell 2016). These grounds, however, cannot constitute the singular 
representation itself. For example, one of Dan’s voices, though originally bound into a 
singular representation on the basis of location, could move location. Similarly, Sean’s angry 
voice might cheer up.  
Note that there must be this singular representation, however sparse, in order to 
enable enough continuity over time to allow the voice hearer to judge that (or even wonder 
whether), this voice heard now is the same as that voice, heard yesterday.  
 
A Paradox in Voice-Hearing 
There is one final phenomenological feature of these transcripts that we would like to 
mention—a feature that further highlights the experiential complexity of voice-hearing while 
also re-affirming the need to remain committed to preserving this complexity in our 
descriptions and analysis. This complexity can be seen by highlighting what appears to be a 
kind of tension, or contradiction, running through many of these reports. In short, voices are 
described as experienced—often simultaneously—as being both like and unlike voices heard 
in everyday life. 
On one hand, the voices are regularly described as having an experiential profile like 
voices heard in everyday life. They have auditory qualities and speech-like properties that 
everyday voices have: they have thematic or expressive content that is often directed toward 
the hearer (sometimes positive and affirming, although more often negative and distressing) 
and they are bound to distinct owners in that they are tied to re-identifiable agents over time. 
However, even though voices share these qualities with everyday voices, they present other 
qualities, too, that further complicate their phenomenological profile. In short: they are also 
often experienced as radically unlike everyday voices in some important ways.  
This can be seen in the way that some of these reports convey an experience of voice-
hearing that is clearer, or somehow more pronounced, than the experience of perceiving a 
voice in everyday life. In other words, the voice is experientially manifest within an intensity 
that can be overwhelming. Of course, similar experiences can happen when hearing voices in 
everyday life, such as when the ambient vocal noise at a pub or party becomes too much and 
one flees outside for an auditory break. However, unlike the pub and party cases, these 
transcripts described experiences of voices that seem to emanate from within; their 
overwhelming character comes not from a relentless penetration of sounds coming in through 
one’s ears (although some have this quality, which further complicates things) but rather as 
bubbling up from within one’s inner psychoacoustic landscape. Accordingly, these experience 
can seem “more real than reality” (Karlsson 2008) because the voice is not felt to have an 
external origin. Whereas voices from the external world are mediated by a variety of factors 
(the speaker’s body, occlusion by other ambient noise, etc.) that specify their felt character, 
many of the voices in these reports lack this public character. And the phenomenological 
lesson, then, is that many of the voice-hearing experiences described in these transcripts seem 
to have a peculiar form of directedness, or what phenomenologists call “intentionality” 
(Ratcliffe 2017, p.91). The voices are experienced, on one hand, as somehow less real 
because they are not rooted in the public world; however, on the other hand, they are also felt 
to be more real for precisely this reason. The hearer cannot distance themselves from the 
voice, which is why they are often perceived as having extraordinary power over the hearer 
(Chadwick and Birchwood 1994) and compel hearers to feel as though they lack the agency 
to reinterpret or repudiate their negative appraisals. 
There is much more that could be said about these transcripts, of course. But the 
takeaway message is simple: voice-hearing in psychosis is complex, both conceptually and 
phenomenologically, in way that far exceeds the standard technical term “auditory verbal 
hallucination”.  Acknowledging this complexity can help us refine our descriptions, deepen 
our understanding, and, ideally, develop a more emphatic stance toward voice hearers and 
their rich variety of voice hearing experiences.         
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